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Appellate Court No. 
Priority Number 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is the direct appeal of a conviction on a driving under 
the influence charge. After trial, Defendant filed a Motion for 
Order Arresting Judgment. The Notice of Appeal in this case was 
timely filed after said Motion was denied. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
a. Does U.C.A. 76-1-202(2) conflict with U.C.A. 76-1-
501(3), and the due process requirement for the government to 
present proof on the issue of Venue? (Question of law, de novo 
review, Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 (Ut. 1982). 
b. Does the mandatory requirement that all offenses shall be 
prosecuted in the county where they occurred (U.C.A. 76-l-202(a)) 
render U.C.A. 76-1-501(3) unconstitutional as violative of the 
requirement that all of the facts constituting an offense must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt (In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 
(1970)? (Question of law, de novo review, Olwell v. Clark, 658 
P.2d 585 (Ut. 1982)) . 
c. Is there insufficient evidence to convict as a matter of 
law, when the Information states that an offense occurred in West 
Valley City, and the testimony contains only an address, but there 
is no evidence that that address is even in Salt Lake County, let 
alone in West Valley City? (Question of how venue is to be proved 
is one of law, de novo review, Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 (Ut. 
1982)). 
d. Did the Circuit Court err in taking judicial notice of 
the location of a numerical address, especially when there was not 
even any evidence introduced regarding the County in which the 
offense is alleged to have occurred? (Question of Law, de novo 
review, Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 (Ut. 1982)). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
Included in the addendum, please find a photocopy of U.C.A. 
76-1-202; U.C.A. 76-1-501; and the Fifth Amendment to the U. S. 
Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
a. Nature of the Case: This case involves a prosecution in 
the West Valley Department of the Third Circuit Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah for driving under the influence. 
b. Course of Proceeding: Prosecution was commenced with the 
filing of an Information on November 19, 1992. A bench trial was 
then held on January 13, 1992, before the Honorable William A. 
Thorne. Sentencing was scheduled for February 18, 1993, and a 
timely Motion for Order Arresting Judgment was filed by Defendant 
on January 21, 1993. This motion was responded to by the 
government on February 9, 1993. Subsequently, the parties were 
informed by Judge Thorne that the Motion of Defendant would be 
denied, and they worked out stipulated language that became the 
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F i n d i n g s , C o n c l u s i o n s and Order on D e f e n d a n t ' s M o t i o n f o r Order 
A r r e s t i n g Judgment e n t e r e d by t h e C o u r t . S a i d Order was s i g n e d on 
March 1 7 , 1 9 9 3 . T i m e l y N o t i c e of Appeal was t h e n s u b m i t t e d on 
A p r i l 8 , 1 9 9 3 . 
c . D i s p o s i t i o n by t h e T r i a l C o u r t : D e f e n d a n t was s e n t e n c e d 
on F e b r u a r y 1 8 , 1993 t o a $ 1 , 2 0 0 f i n e , two d a y s i n j a i l and 178 
d a y s s u s p e n d e d , and a p e r i o d of p r o b a t i o n f o r one y e a r . T h e r e was 
a l s o a community s e r v i c e component t o t h e s e n t e n c e , 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1 . A p p e l l a n t was c h a r g e d w i t h d r i v i n g under t h e i n f l u e n c e , 
i n an I n f o r m a t i o n t h a t c h a r g e d t h i s o f f e n s e a s h a v i n g o c c u r r e d i n 
West V a l l e y C i t y , U t a h . ( R - 3 , P 2 ; R - l , P 2 ) * l 
2 . T r i a l of t h i s c a s e was had t o t h e C o u r t , Judge W i l l i a m A. 
Thorne p r e s i d i n g . ( R - 3 , P . 2 ) 
3 . At t r i a l , no w i t n e s s t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h i s o f f e n s e o c c u r r e d 
i n West V a l l e y C i t y , U t a h . ( R - 3 , P . 2 ) 
4 . At t r i a l , no w i t n e s s t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e o f f e n s e e v e n 
o c c u r r e d anywhere i n S a l t Lake C o u n t y . ( R - l , P . 2 ) 
5 . The o n l y w i t n e s s e s t e s t i f y i n g i n t h i s c a s e were one 
C o l e e n H a n s e n , and West V a l l e y C i t y P o l i c e O f f i c e r B l a c k . ( R - 3 , 
P . 2 ) 
6 . Ms. Hansen t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h i s o f f e n s e o c c u r r e d a t h e r 
J 
The parties have already reached agreement that al l the relevant facts in this case are included in the three 
submissions included in the accompanying Addendum, Accordingly, the "Motion for Order Arresting Judgment" shall 
be referred to herein as "R-l"; the "Response to Motion for Order Arresting Judgment" as "R-2": and the "Findings, 
Conlcusions, and Order on Defendant's Motion for Order Arresting Judgment" as "R-3", with these designations to 
be followed by the appropriate page number(s) of the item being referenced, 
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place of employment, address "3596 West 3100 South". (R-3, P.3) 
7. Judge Thorne took judicial notice of the fact that the 
numbers "3596 West 3100 South" could correspond with an address 
within West Valley City. (R-3, P.3) 
8. "The Court gave little weight to the evidence that the 
arresting officer was a West Valley City officer". (R-3, P.3) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Argument 1. 
Both U.C.A. 76-1-501(3), and the due process clause require 
the government to present proof on the venue issue, so U.C.A. 76-1-
202(2) must be deemed to be invalid, to whatever extent it is 
interpreted as negating this requirement. 
Argument II. 
The first sentence of U.C.A. 76-1-202(1) is sufficiently 
mandatory to impose venue as an actual element of every offense 
charged in this state. Accordingly, U.C.A. 76-1-501(3) is invalid 
to the extent that it purports to create a burden of proof on this 
element that is less than beyond a reasonable doubt 
Argument III. 
Insufficiency of the evidence is made out as a matter of law 
in Utah any time that the government presents it's case in a 
criminal trial, but offers no evidence regarding the city or county 
in which the alleged offense occurred. 
Argument IV. 
The Utah Supreme Court has already precluded trial courts from 
taking judicial notice of the location of an address in any case 
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where the city in which the address occurs is not put in evidence. 
ARGUMENTS 
Argument I. 
DOES U.C.A. 76-1-202(2) CONFLICT WITH U.C.A. 
76-1-501(3), AND THE DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT 
FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO PRESENT PROOF ON THE 
ISSUE OF VENUE? 
As it is written, U.C.A. 76-1-202(2) appears to function as a 
virtual mandatory rebuttable presumption of guilt on the question 
of where an alleged offense occurred. That is, unless a Defendant 
takes some initial affirmative action, it can never be argued that 
the government failed to bear its evidentiary burden on the 
question. 
Interpreted in that manner, U.C.A. 76-1-202(2) would appear to 
be in clear conflict with both State v. Bailey, 282 P.2d 339 (Utah 
1955), and State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466 (Ut. App. 1988). In 
Bailey, the Supreme Court gave explicit approval to an instruction 
that the government had to prove that the offense occurred within 
the boundaries of the governmental entity where it was alleged to 
have occurred. (At P. 341) In Bailey, as in the instant case, the 
Defendant was trying to use this failure of proof as a way to get 
the conviction reversed, rather than asking, as an initial matter, 
just to have his trial held in another location. 
While it is true that Sorenson deals with an issue of 
jurisdiction, rather than of venue, the Court did explicitly rely 
upon U.C.A. 76-1-501(3), which treats both of these matters the 
same. Further, the Court held that where the crime occurred is 
exactly the sort of issue upon which the government bears both the 
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burden of proof, and the initial burden of persuasion, basing this 
conclusion on the requirements of due process detailed in In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). "[T]he rule established in Winship 
is not limited to those facts essential to establish the elements 
of the offense in the technical sense." Sorenson at P.469. Thus, 
the "devise" contained in U.C.A. 76-1-202(2) appears to be in no 
significant particular different from that which led to the 
reversal in Sorenson, and the same result should follow here. (See 
also State v. Tibbs, 786 P.2d 775, 778-79, (Ut. App. 1990)) 
Argument UL_ 
DOES THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENT THAT ALL 
OFFENSES SHALL BE PROSECUTED IN THE COUNTY 
WHERE THEY OCCURRED (U.C.A. 76-1-202(1)) 
RENDER U.C.A. 7 6-1-501(3) UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS 
VIOLATIVE OF THE REQUIREMENT THAT ALL OF THE 
FACTS CONSTITUTING AN OFFENSE MUST BE PROVED 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT (IN RE WINSHIP, 3 97 
U.S. 358, 364 (1970)? 
The only thing that kept the Court of Appeals from saying, in 
Sorenson, that the government must prove venue beyond a reasonable 
doubt is the "preponderance of the evidence" language in U.C.A. 76-
1-501(3). However, U.C.A. 76-1-202(1) says that "Criminal actions 
_sha>LL be tried in the county or district where the offense is 
alleged to have been committed." (emphasis added). In using such 
mandatory language, the legislature appears to have created the 
requirement that no criminal conviction can be obtained without 
both an allegation, and proof, regarding where the criminal conduct 
occurred. Viewed in this way, "venue", or proof of the location of 
the commission of a crime, becomes one of the actual elements of 
every criminal charge in this state. Winship stands for the 
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absolute proposition that every element of a crime is 
constitutionally required to be proven by the government beyond a 
reasonable doubt. To whatever extent, then, that Section 76-1-
501(3) attempts to relieve the government of this burden, it must 
be held to be invalid. 
Argument III. 
IS THERE INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW, WHEN THE INFORMATION STATES 
THAT AN OFFENSE OCCURRED IN WEST VALLEY CITY, 
AND THE TESTIMONY CONTAINS ONLY AN ADDRESS, 
BUT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THAT ADDRESS IS 
EVEN IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, LET ALONE IN WEST 
VALLEY CITY? 
If this Court decides that the place of the commission of an 
offense is a matter that the government is required to present 
evidence on (even under the lower standard that was accepted in 
Sorenson), then the instant conviction must be reversed. With the 
exception of only the numbers that can make up an address, the 
government produced no evidence of where the alleged conduct of 
this Defendant took place. The trial Court virtually discounted 
the fact that the arrest in this case was made by West Valley City 
police, and police make arrests in other jurisdictions often 
enough, for a variety of reasons, that it could hardly have done 
otherwise. Likewise, the invitation of the government to place 
significance on who the prosecuting office is (R-2, P.3) must be 
declined, because, otherwise, the mere filing of an information 
would always settle the question of whether the prosecution was 
brought in the right place. Finally, Utah law does not allow the 
trial court to take the sort of judicial notice that it based its 
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decision to convict on in this case. Because of this, there is an 
absolute failure of proof on the affirmative allegation that this 
offense occurred in West Valley City, and the conviction of 
Defendant Flower must be reversed. 
Argument IV_. 
DID THE CIRCUIT COURT ERR IN TAKING JUDICIAL 
NOTICE OF THE LOCATION OF A NUMERICAL ADDRESS, 
ESPECIALLY WHEN THERE WAS NOT EVEN ANY 
EVIDENCE INTRODUCED REGARDING THE COUNTY IN 
WHICH THE OFFENSE IS ALLEGED TO HAVE OCCURRED? 
In In re Philips Estate, 44 P.2d, 699 (Utah 1935), the Supreme 
Court held that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of 
the fact that University Avenue and Center Street are in Provo (at 
P. 705). There, as in the instant case, the record was completely 
silent regarding specifically which sets of University Avenue and 
Center Street occurring in Utah were being referred to. Likewise, 
here, "3596 West 3100 South" clearly can be an address in this 
State, but nothing else is known about it. It is even technically 
possible for this address to occur in West Valley City, if some 
building and street there have been so designated. However, 
nothing in the record tells us that these numbers refer to a place 
in Salt Lake County, as opposed to one in Weber County, or Cache 
County, or Davis County, or Utah county, etc. Given this complete 
lack of specificity, Philips Estate prohibits the trial court from 
taking the sort of judicial notice that it relied upon in 
convicting Mr. Flower, and said conviction must be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the offense alleged in this case occurred in West Valley City. In 
fact, it did not even produce any admissible evidence on this 
point. Accordingly, the conviction of Defendant must be reversed, 
and the case remanded with instructions to discharge the Defendant. 
Respectfully submitted this lj day of June, 1993. 
ROBERT BREEZE 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify I mailed a copy of the foregoing to: 
J. Richard Catten 
West Valley City Attorney 
3600 South 2700 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
on this / Y day of June, 1993 
ROBERT BREEZE 
Attorney for Defendant 
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ROBERT BREEZE #4278 
Attorney for Defendant 
211 East Broadway #215 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 322-2138 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
WEST VALLEY CITY DEPARTMENT 




GROVE L. FLOWER, ) Case No. 925013801 TC 
Defendant. ) Honorable William A. Thorne 
COMES NOW the Defendant pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure who moves this Court for an Order arresting 
Judgment for the reason and on the grounds that the prosecution 
failed to prove an essential element of the offense herein, i.e. 
that said offense occurred within the corporate limits of West 
Valley City, Utah. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. This matter came for trial before the Honorable Judge 
William A. Thorne on Wednesday the 13th day of January, 1993 on the 
9 O'clock A.M. Calendar. 
2. The defendant was charged by information with violation of 
two violations of the Utah Code, DUI and reckless driving. (See 
information on file). 
3. Two witnesses testified at the trial, Officer Black, a 
West Valley City patrol officer and Coleen Hansen, a private 
citizen. 
4. The prosecution did not elicit from any witness evidence 
that the offense herein took place within the corporate limits of 
West Valley City, Utah (See attached Affidavits). It should also 
be noted that no evidence was elicited that the offense took place 
within Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
5. The only evidence regarding location came from witness 
Coleen Hansen wherein said witness responded affirmatively when 
asked the question of whether her employment was located at 3596 
West 3100 South. (Tape Count at approximately 2340). At Tape 
Count 2366, the prosecutor asked if Coleen Hansen was working at 
the above location on the date of November 15, 1992. The witness 
indicated that she was working at said address on said date. 
6. No witness testified that the address referred to above is 




LOCATION IS A PRIMA FACIE ELEMENT 
OF THE OFFENSE 
The information filed herein alleges that the offenses took 
place within West Valley City, Utah. The Utah Supreme Court in the 
case of State v. Noren, 704 P.2d 568,570 (Ut. 1985) stated that: 
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"...it is necessary that the prosecution present some evidence of 
every element needed to make out a cause of action." 
Title 10 of the Utah Code does not specifically authorize 
cities to prosecute DUI offenses however in the case of Salt Lake 
City v. Kusse, 93 P.2d 671 (Ut. 1938) the Utah Supreme Court 
implied such a power. 
There is a scarcity of Utah law regarding the subject of 
location however, in State v. Turner, 731 P.2d 493 (Ut. 1986) the 
Court did address the issue of location and judicial notice 
thereof. The Turner decision specifically cited an Idaho and a 
Kansas case regarding the location issue. In the Kansas case, 
State v. Griffin, 504 P.2d 150 (Ks. 1972) it was ruled that a court 
could take judicial notice that a city was within a county, as was 
done in the Turner case. In the Idaho case, State v. Shannon, 507 
P.2d 808 (Id. 1973) the court stated that "The venue of an offense 
must, however, be proven as must all material allegations". Id.813. 
In a more recent case the Oklahoma Court of Appeals stated in 
Sproles v. City of Tulsa, 7 30 P. 2d 9 (Okl a . App. 19 986) that while it 
is permissible to take judicial notice of boundaries of counties 
and geographical location of cities and towns within the state, 
"...[we] will not take judical notice of streets and buildings when 




The City failed to prove that the offenses alleged herein took 
place within the corporate boundaries of West Valley City or Salt 
Lake County. 
WHEREFORE, defendant prays for an order: 
1. Arresting judgment herein on the grounds that the City 
failed to prove an essential element of the charges to wit: 
location. 
2. Dismissing the charges herein. 
DATED this Z/\ day of January, 1993. 
n 
ROBERT BREEZE 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify I mailed a copy of the foregoing to: 
Keith L. Stoney 
West Valley City Prosecutor 
3600 South 2700 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
on this January, 1993. 
_^_ 
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ROBERT BREEZE #4278 
Attorney for Defendant 
211 East Broadway #215 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 322-2138 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
WEST VALLEY CITY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, ) AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL HOLMAN 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
GROVE L. FLOWER, ) Case No. 925013801 TC 
Defendant. ) Honorable William A. Thorne 
State of Utah ) 
ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
COMES NOW Michael Holman being first duly sworn upon my oath 
to state as true the following: 
1. I am employed as a paralegal/clerk for Robert Breeze, 
attorney; 
2. On or about Thursday, January 14, 1993, pursuant to my 
employer's instructions, I went to the West Valley Circuit Court to 
listen to the tape of the trial had on Wednesday, January 13, 1993; 
3. Upon arrival at the Court the Court Clerk obtained a tape 
of the proceeding and put it in a tape machine for me; 
4. I listened to the entire tape of the trial; 
5. The only reference to location was from witness Coleen 
Hansen; 
6. I did not note the exact language used by witness Hansen 
however, I did notify my employer that the only reference to 
location was at the beginning of the questioning of witness Coleen 
Hansen. 
UCHAEL HQLMAN 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by affiant on this f_j_ 
day of January, 1993. 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: IA rM\vi lUtf u 
Notary Public, State of Utah 
(I '•' Y • 1 If , I / " 1
 f __„^slduva,_SLtJ^lt Lake County 
' 3 
t ' ' 8 
I •. ' , 0 
ROBERT BREEZE #4278 
Attorney for Defendant 
211 East Broadway #215 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 322-2138 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
WEST VALLEY CITY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, ) AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT BREEZE 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
GROVE L. FLOWER, ) Case No. 925013801 TC 
Defendant. ) Honorable William A. Thorne 
State of Utah ) 
ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
COMES NOW Robert Breeze being first duly sworn upon my oath to 
state as true the following: 
1. I am the attorney for Defendant Grove L. Flower; 
2. On Friday, January 15, 1993 I went to the West Valley 
Circuit Court and listened to the tape of the testimony of the 
trial had herein; 
3. I listened only to the portion of the tape wherein Coleen 
Hansen answered affirmatively to the questions "Is that located at 
3596 West 3100 South?" and "Were you working there on November 15, 
1992?". 
4. I have paid for and ordered a tape of the trial herein and 
requested that said tape be forwarded to Mr. Keith Stoney. I have 
also requested that Mr. Stoney point out any proof of location once 
he had listened to said tape. I have proceeded in this manner in 
order to save my client to cost of a transcript. 
ROBERT BREEZE 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by affiant on this 
day of January, 1993. 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES 
1
 • , , ' , " : 
Notary Public, State of Utah 
Residing at Salt Lake County 
, „„.„. , ,^ 
I - • .•. B 
i'. • • • - ! 
» ^ ' •. a 
L a trm f i r - 1 «~J t "S c -j a s era r a a i r —J — i i j caJ 
J. Richard Catten (#4291) 
Senior Attorney 
WEST VALLEY CITY 
3600 Constitution Boulevard 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
(801)963-3271 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT (WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT), 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH (WVC), : 
Plaintiff, s 
v. : 
GROVE L. FLOWER, ; 
Defendant. : 
: RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR 
: ORDER ARRESTING JUDGMENT 
: Case No. 925013801 TC 
t Judge William A. Thorne 
West Valley City, the prosecuting agency in the above-entitled 
action, responds to Defendant Grove L. Flower's Motion for Order 
Arresting Judgment as follows: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
West Valley City concurs in the statement of material facts 
provided by Defendant in his Motion for Order Arresting Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOCATION AT WHICH THE CRIME OCCURRED 
RELATES TO JURISDICTION AND VENUE ISSUES, AND 
IS NOT AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE. 
Defendant's Motion is based upon the rationale that the 
location at which an offense occurred is an essential element of 
the offense charged, and that West Valley City ("City") failed to 
prove that element at trial. This is simply not a correct legal 
analysis. The location of an offense relates to whether or not the 
court has jurisdiction and whether or not the trial is taking place 
in the proper venue. In this case, the charge was a violation of 
Section 41-6-44, Utah Code Annotated (U.C.A.), "Driving under the 
influence of alcohol," and Section 41-6-45, U.C.A., "Reckless 
Driving," both misdemeanors which are unquestionably within the 
jurisdiction of the circuit courts of this State to try. There 
being no jurisdictional issue raised by Defendant, the question 
becomes one of proper venue. 
Venue is not an essential element of a criminal offense and 
may be established by circumstantial evidence on a preponderance of 
the evidence standard. In State v. Bailey, 282 P. 2d 339 (Utah 
1955), the Utah Supreme Court ruled in a very similar case. In 
Bailey, the witnesses testified that the offense (which was also 
"driving under the influence") had been committed at "Roller Mill 
Hill," and that there was no direct proof that the offense was 
committed within Garfield County. The Supreme Court quoted an 
earlier case, State v. Mitchell, 278 P. 2d 618 (Utah 1955), and 
stated that: 
Some authorities, including this court, permit 
venue to be established inferentially by 
circumstantial evidence. We believe and hold 
that however it is proved it must be done by a 
preponderance of the evidence only and not 
beyond a reasonable doubt, since venue is not 
an element of the offense, and there seems to 
be no reason to require the same quantum and 
quality of proof to prove venue as is required 
to prove such elements. 
Also, the Criminal Code itself sets a similarly clear 
standard. Section 76-1-105(3), U.C.A., states, "The existence of 
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jurisdiction and venue are not elements of the offense, but shall 
be established by preponderance of the evidence." 
In this case, there was testimony by witness Hansen that the 
offense occurred at her place of employment, which was located at 
3596 West 3100 South. There was further evidence that the City, in 
the person of Officer Black, was the agency dispatched to the scene 
of the offense. Also, the prosecuting agency was the West Valley 
City Attorney's Office. These facts clearly provide the Court with 
sufficient circumstantial evidence to find by a preponderance that 
the offenses occurred within the City. That is the only direct and 
logical inference which the evidence will allow in this case. As 
the Supreme Court of Montana stated in addressing this issue: 
No positive testimony that the violation 
occurred at this specific place is required, 
it is sufficient if it can be concluded from 
the evidence as a whole that the act was 
committed in the county where the indictment 
is found. Circumstantial evidence may be and 
often is stronger and more convincing than 
direct evidence . . . If, from the facts and 
evidence, the only rational conclusion which 
can be drawn is that the crime was committed 
in the state and county alleged, the proof is 
sufficient. 
State v. Campbell, 500 P.2d 801 (Montana 1972). 
Also, Defendant has waived his opportunity to contest venue. 
Section 76-1-201, U.C.A., provides that "all objections to improper 
place of trial are waived by a defendant unless made before trial." 
See also, State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909 (Utah 1988). 
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POINT II 
THE COURT MAY TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE THAT THE 
STREET ADDRESS OF 3596 WEST 3100 SOUTH IS 
LOCATED WITHIN WEST VALLEY CITY. 
The rule governing judicial notice of adjudicated facts is set 
forth in Rule 201(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which states: 
A judicially noticed fact must be one not 
subject to reasonable dispute in that it is 
either (1) generally known within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or 
(2) capable of accurate and ready 
determination by resort to sources whose 
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, 
A court is presumed to know what is generally known or what a 
person of ordinary intelligence would know. In this case, any 
person of ordinary intelligence within Salt Lake County certainly 
would recognize and be able to locate 3596 West 3100 South as an 
address within West Valley City. This is especially true in the 
Salt Lake Valley, where the numbering system is valley-wide and is 
not duplicated from city to city. Furthermore, this is not an 
obscure address since it could be recognized as being near or on 
the corner of two main thoroughfares — 3600 West and 3100 South. 
Also, this address certainly allows for accurate and ready 
determination by the Court's reference to various City maps. The 
West Valley City zoning map, the West Valley City master plan map, 
and the West Valley City major street plan map are all sources 
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. The zoning map, as 
amended, was adopted by City Ordinance No. 80-6 and shows all major 
streets by name, including 3600 West and 3100 South. (See Exhibit 
4 
A. ) Reference to those maps indicates that the address given by 
the witness is located well within the boundaries of the City. 
Defendant cites a case from Oklahoma, Sproles v. City of 
Tulsa, 730 P. 2d 9 (Okla. App. 1986), for the proposition that 
courts will not take judicial notice of streets and buildings. 
However, that opinion is not universal, and several other states do 
allow such judicial notice. See State v. Nelson, 543 So. 2d 1058 
(La. App. 4 Cir. 1989); State v, Larsen, 442 N.W.2d 840 (Minn. App. 
1989); State v. Spain, 759 S.W.2d 871 (Mo. App. 1988); and People 
v. Hosney, 22 Cal. Rptr. 397 (Cal. App. 1962). 
CONCLUSION 
The venue of an offense is clearly not an element of the crime 
and may be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. In this 
case, the testimony of the witnesses provides this Court with 
circumstantial evidence upon which it may base its finding that the 
offenses charged took place within West Valley City. Also, the 
Court may take judicial notice that the address given by witness 
Hansen is within West Valley City, both from common knowledge and 
reference to sources such as city maps. 
Defendant's Motion for Order Arresting Judgment should be 
denied. 
DATED this 9th day of February, 1993. 
WEST VALLEY CITY 
J.(Richard Catten 
Atrorney for Plaintiff 
JRC:KH:FLOWER.RES 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, certify that on the 9th day of February, 
1993, I mailed (postage prepaid) a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Response to Motion for Order Arresting Judgment to the 
following party: 
Robert B. Breeze 
Attorney for Defendant 
211 East 300 South, #215 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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J. Richard Catten (#4291) 
Senior Attorney 
WEST VALLEY CITY 
3600 Constitution Boulevard 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
(801)963-3271 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH (WVC), 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GROVE L. FLOWER, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR ORDER ARRESTING JUDGMENT 
Case No. 925013701 TC 
Judge William A. Thorne 
Defendant Grove L. Flower having presented a Motion for Order 
Arresting Judgment pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, the Court received written memoranda in support 
and in opposition to the Motion. The parties also appeared before 
the Court in oral argument on the Motion on February 18, 1993, with 
Robert B. Breeze appearing for the Defendant and J. Richard Catten 
appearing for the prosecuting agency, West Valley City, The Court, 
upon review of the pleadings, memoranda, affidavits, authorities, 
and arguments of the parties, and being fully advised in the 
premises, hereby makes and enters the following findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and order with respect to Defendant's Motion 
for Order Arresting Judgment-
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant was charged, by Information, with violation of 
Section 41-6-44, Utah Code Annotated (UCA), "Driving under the 
influence of alcohol," and Section 41-6-45, UCA, "Reckless 
driving." 
2. The matter was heard as a bench trial in the Third 
Circuit Court, West Valley Department, on January 13, 1993, before 
the Honorable William A. Thome. 
3. Two witnesses were presented by the prosecution --
Colleen Hansen, a private citizen, and Officer Blackf a West Valley 
City Police Department Patrol Officer. The defense presented no 
witnesses. 
4. At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence and 
arguments, the Court found the Defendant guilty of driving under 
the influence of alcohol and not guilty of reckless driving. 
5. On or about January 21, 1993, Defendant filed a Motion 
for Order Arresting Judgment and accompanying affidavits, pursuant 
to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
6. On or about February 9, 1993, Plaintiff filed a Response 
to Motion for Order Arresting Judgment. 
1. At oral argument on February 18, 199 3, the parties 
stipulated on the record, and the Court finds the following: 
a. Neither witness directly testified that the offense 
of driving under the influence occurred within the 
limits of West Valley City. 
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b. Witness Hansen testified that the offense occurred 
at her place of employment, which was located at 
3596 West 3100 South. 
8. The Court is familiar with the location of the address of 
3596 West 3100 South and knows it to be within West Valley City 
limits. The address is unique, and there is not another 3596 West 
3100 South within Salt Lake County. The Court further finds that 
3596 West 3100 South is not located near the border of West Valley 
City or any other jurisdiction; but, rather, is located near the 
center of West Valley City. 
9. The address of 3596 West 3100 South is generally known 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court to be within West 
Valley City. 
10. The Court, based upon the address evidence presented by 
Witness Hansen, took judicial notice at the time of the trial that 
the address of 3596 West 3100 South is located within West Valley 
City. The Court gave little weight to the evidence that the 
arresting officer was a West Valley City officer. 
11. The Court, at the time of the trial, did not nraku auLo ou 
place on the record that the Court had taken judicial notice that 
the address was within West Valley City. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that a 
court may take judicial notice of adjudicative facts which are not 
subject to reasonable dispute and which are generally known within 
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court. 
2. It is not subject to reasonable dispute that the address 
of 3596 West 3100 South is generally known within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the Court as being within West Valley City limits. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, Defendant's Motion for Order 
Arresting Judgment is denied. 
DATED this day of /^-~(— 1993. 
>^V 
William A/ Thome 
Third Circuit Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
S- <-£~- ?2 
Robert B. Br? 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, certify that on the day of 
March, 1993, I mailed (postage prepaid) a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Findings, Conclusions, and Order on Defendant's 
Motion for Order Arresting Judgment to the following party: 
Robert B. Breeze, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant 
211 East 300 South, #215 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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